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The Eastern Partnership Initiative:
A New Opportunity for Neighbours?
ELENA KOROSTELEVA
The EU’s relationship with its neighbours to the east has long been founded on the
aspiration to build a kind of partnership that does not automatically offer the prospect
of membership to former Soviet republics apart from the Baltic States. The mechanism
for this was initially the European Neighbourhood Policy, embracing a wider range of
countries, which has been further buttressed by the Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP)
in an effort to revitalize the partnership-building process in the east. Although more dif-
ferentiated and versatile, the EaP has nevertheless inherited the Neighbourhood
Policy’s original conceptual limitations, especially concerning the ill-defined nature
of partnership. Practical limitations, on the other hand, include the policy’s lack of
coherence and management, as well as its low visibility and public appreciation on
the ground across the board. The East European response to the EU’s initiative
reveals further tensions and contradictions, especially pertaining to partner countries’
geopolitics and cultural and civilization differences. It is clear that the EU’s ‘politics
of inclusion’ needs further conceptualization in order to shift the balance away from
the EU towards the partner countries themselves. Only in these circumstances of
de-centring can the notion of partnership become true and effective.
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004 in response
to the eastward enlargement of the European Union (EU). Given its unprece-
dented geographical and political expansion into the former socialist bloc, the
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policy sought to address two critical strategic issues: ‘to avoid drawing new
dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and
beyond the new borders of the Union’.1 Despite these commendable aims,
the ENP, however, had from the outset a conflicting logic embedded in its
rhetoric and action, which subsequently prevented its successful realization
in the neighbourhood. The policy found it difficult to reconcile its ‘idealist’
rhetoric of creating ‘a ring of friends’2 around Europe with its ‘realist’ secur-
ity-predicated need to protect its borders and encircle itself with ‘well-
governed countries’.3 It also struggled to adapt suitable means to incentivize
the neighbours into adopting painful and costly reforms in exchange for a
less-tangible promise of economic integration in the future. ‘Special’ or ‘pri-
vileged’4 relations, devoid of EU membership, carried limited appeal. The
vision of the future, the so-called finalite´ for the neighbours, has been an
obstacle equally for EU policy-makers and for the recipients, as the conflicting
descriptors, ‘European neighbours’ and ‘the neighbours of Europe’,5 applied
to the outsiders, tacitly suggest.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that the ENP received a mixed and de-
legitimizing response from the eastern neighbours who were either hesitant
or indeed rejective from the outset. To respond to the policy’s unintended
consequences,6 the Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP) was launched on 7
May 2009, at the Prague summit of EU member states and EU officials.
A joint declaration with six East European partners – Belarus, Ukraine,
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – was signed to facilitate
closer co-operation with the region. The EaP was declared an essential
step towards creating ‘the necessary conditions to accelerate political associ-
ation and further economic integration between the EU and interested
partner countries’.7 The policy’s added value was unambiguously seen in
the realization of ‘a more ambitious partnership’ with neighbours, based
on mutual interests, shared ownership and responsibility.8
The new initiative indeed offers the whole range of original projects, tools
and resources. It has innovatively launched a dual-track approach to the
region, which envisages both deepening EU’s bilateral relations with the inter-
ested parties, and also, through a multi-lateral dimension, developing new
relations with those that hitherto lacked structured relations with the EU
(for example, Belarus) and one another. In principle, the dual-track approach
seeks to pursue greater differentiation towards the front runners (such as
Ukraine and Moldova), and also to provide more opportunities for the less
experienced partners, with the ambition of creating a joint Neighbourhood
Economic Community in the future.9 The initiative also outlines four thematic
platforms of good governance and democracy, economic convergence with
EU legislation (the acquis communautaire), energy security, and people-
to-people contacts, to be embedded through new association agreements,

























and a range of specific projects to bring the partners into ‘ever closer’ union. It
also envisages five flagship initiatives to be developed on a needs-serving
basis, and through intensive engagement with the region’s civil society. In
summary, the EaP appears to be timely and potentially capable of re-
invigorating the ENP’s appeal and its legitimation in the area. In the words of
Stefan Fu¨le, the Commissioner for Enlargement and the ENP, the EaP is
better equipped ‘to support democratic and market-oriented reforms in partner
countries, consolidate their statehood and bring them closer to the EU’.10
A year after its launch, the EaP was slowly beginning to demonstrate its
visibility for the partner countries: a number of concrete projects had received
financial endorsement; the ENP/EaP budget for 2010–13 had increased by a
third of a billion euro; and a string of meetings concerning inter-parliamentary
and civil society activities were under way, along with negotiations on the new
Association Agreements.11 Could this suggest that the EaP may finally
become the desirable and successful EU foreign policy needed for the neigh-
bourhood? Will the initiative be capable of regaining and revitalizing the
ENP’s appeal in the region? Is it really a new opportunity for the neighbours,
a sort of a ‘reset’ moment in their relations with the EU?
In order to address these and other questions, an extensive empirical inves-
tigation was conducted during 2008–10 under the aegis of the ESRC-funded
project, ‘Europeanising or Securitising the “Outsiders”? Assessing the EU’s
partnership-building approach with Eastern Europe’ (RES-061-25-0001).12
The project focused on examining the ENP and EaP’s effectiveness in the
neighbourhood, and on the difficulties associated with its implementation
in the four East European countries – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and
Russia.13 Over a hundred interviews with officials in Brussels and Strasbourg
and across the eastern neighbourhood were conducted, in addition to compre-
hensive nationwide surveys, focus-groups and a study of school essays in the
Eastern region.14 The members of the cabinet of the commissioner for enlar-
gement and the ENP15 noted that taking stock of the ENP/EaP’s realization in
the region and monitoring the extent of the acceptance of the policy by the
partners has proved useful for the forthcoming review of major instruments
and EU actions in the eastern neighbourhood.
Our research, however, has revealed a rather mixed picture. On the one
hand, the findings clearly point to a greater Europeanization of the general
public, and growing knowledge of, and interest towards, the EU. Younger, edu-
cated and professional members of the East European societies evidently
demonstrate stronger interest in or awareness of their western counterparts;
whereas policy-makers and government officials generally welcome the oppor-
tunity of closer co-operation and economic assistance. On the other hand, this
positive experience is counter-balanced by the increasing anxiety in relation to
the choice the partner countries feel they have tomake: a closer integrationwith

























the EU or with Russia? They also seem confused by the joint-ownership rheto-
ric, which appears to be asymmetrical and heavily dominated by EU priorities,
and equally disheartened by the uncertainty of the finalite´ for their efforts and
commitment to reform. The policy continues to be fraught withmisconceptions
and expectation gaps across the eastern border, still falling short of the desired
credibility and leverage to facilitate reform in the region.16
This collection offers an analytical excursion into the realities and rhetoric
of the EU and four partner countries, each aspiring to different treatment and
end-products of co-operation, and each presenting a varied range of dilemmas
and challenges for the EU. The present introduction will offer a general over-
view of the conceptual and practical limitations of the policies (ENP/EaP),
stemming from a theoretical examination of policy documents and official dis-
course in the EU and Eastern Europe. It will then conduct the reader through
the corpus of differences and expectations presented by individual case
studies, and explain the nature of contributions to the volume by the teams
of national researchers.
Conceptual and Practical Limitations of the ENP/EaP
New Wine in Old Wineskins?
17
In his seminal article of 1996, Michael E. Smith raised a number of critical
issues related to defining the nature of the relationship between the EU and
the changing European order.18 He noted that one of the most striking and
remarkable developments in the 1990s was a paradigm shift away from a
‘fixed set of boundaries’19 to a ‘politics of inclusion’, necessitated by the
EU’s growing internal complexity and its interdependency with the outside
world. In contrast to the ‘politics of exclusion’ which dominated much of
the European Community’s existence, the new ‘politics of inclusion’, he
argued, was seen as more advantageous for responding to radical changes of
the new European order.20 The core assumptions of the EU’s new politics
directly challenged the traditional notions of statehood by viewing boundaries
as more porous; of security which precipitated ‘a multilayered conception of
political and security space’21 going well beyond the borders of Europe; of
culture and identity, and finally of EU institutional and legal scaffolding
requiring redefinition.
The ‘politics of inclusion’ demanded diversity of method and paths of
development: it prioritized internalization of external disturbances over
their containment, and sought to gain access to rather than control over its
exterior. This has become known as a discourse of ‘negotiated order’,
which amalgamated both exclusiveness and inclusiveness of the EU,
making the latter a centre, a pole of attraction for its external milieu, and a

























‘shaper of [the] normal’ in international relations.22 The EU’s centrality to its
external environment offered a new social construction of order, premised on
the politics of malleable boundaries, which are there ‘for crossing rather than
defending’.23 By ‘boundaries’ Smith implied distinct differences between
sovereign subjects, which would demarcate insiders from the outsiders. He
singled out four critical boundaries that would define a polity as unique: insti-
tutional and legal, transactional, geopolitical and cultural. Smith advocated
the continuing re-drawing of boundaries by the EU, as they would help to
shape the EU’s normative status and legitimate its strategies beyond its
borders by positively transforming the realities affected by them. He clearly
perceived EU boundaries as those that are necessary to shift and expand in
order to ‘accommodate new political and other realities’,24 and to face the
challenges associated with them.
In designing the neighbourhood policy, the EU in a way followed Smith’s
argument of ‘inclusion’, which aimed to blur the differences between the
insiders and the outsiders, without necessitating their amalgamation. In order
to prevent new dividing lines that would emerge between a more prosperous
Europe and its less stable ‘backyard’,25 the EU sought to offer to the latter
an inclusive policy of partnership – a kind of partnership that would push
EU boundaries to the limits of interconnectedness by proffering political
association and economic integration to the neighbourhood, but nevertheless
would prevent neighbours’ physical accession to the EU: ‘to share everything
with the Union but institutions’.26 The notion of partnership was to be based on
‘shared values’, ‘common interests’ and ‘joint ownership’, whereby ‘the EU
[would] not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners . . . There
can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of
priorities’.27 In an actual fact, the EaP went even further to make ‘a more
ambitious partnership’ central to its relations with the neighbours.
In reality, however, this approach proved difficult to sustain. The notion of
partnership devoid of a membership perspective caused a number of tensions,
which have been widely analysed in scholarly literature.28 Bechev and
Nicolaidis argue the principal tensions, which may be hard to reconcile,
include (i) hegemony versus partnership: embedding the asymmetry of
EU power politics in the relations with neighbours from the start; (ii) condi-
tionality versus ownership: questioning compatibility of the logic of coercion
and order with that of consent and equality; (iii) bilateralism versus multilater-
alism: endeavouring to shift the focus away from the EU on to more regional
co-operation between the states; (iv) differentiation versus homogeneity:
implying limited resources and the lack of tangible rewards to more com-
mitted partners; and finally (v) functional versus geo-strategic vision:
suggesting conflicting visions of the finalite´ for EU co-operation with the
outsiders.29

























The major shortcoming in the design of the neighbourhood policy, as the
present article contends, lies with the ill-defined concept of partnership,
critical to the development of structured and successful relations with the
outsiders. Partnership as a concept has hitherto struggled to find its proper
meaning in EU official documents. It still causes an appearance of obfuscation
among EU officials when they are asked to discriminate on the nature and the
degree of embedded asymmetry in the relationship of ‘equals’ between the EU
and partner countries.30 Even its constitutive elements – those of ‘shared
values’ and ‘joint ownership’ – receive better elaboration in official docu-
ments, yet still struggle to accommodate two parties in the equation. Contrary
to their etymological meanings, the partnership elements explicitly prioritize
the EU-laden agenda. In particular, ‘shared values’ have now become fully
institutionalized as ‘the values of the Union’ by the Lisbon Treaty, in
Article 7a; and ‘joint ownership’, which intended to avoid EU imposition
and unilateralism, has been replaced by mutual commitments under the EaP,
thus diminishing the meaning of ownership altogether. As one EU official
commented, ‘It is about injecting our values into the neighbourhood . . .
after all, it is about them aligning with us, rather than vice versa’.31
In the absence of a well-defined notion of partnership and growing con-
fusion about the concepts of ‘joint ownership’ and ‘shared values’, the EU
elected to deploy a means-tested method of external governance, used for
EU enlargement and operating through conditionality and top-down rule trans-
fer.32 External governance draws on a compulsory element of conditionality,
which is at odds with voluntarism and equality of partnership. In different
circumstances (such as when offering accession for convergence), external
governance would be ideally suited for the EU’s control over the process of
partners’ convergence. However, neighbours are not candidates, and may
never become such, and thus the use of conditionality and top-down rule
compliance demanded by the EU from the outsiders under the relationship
of partnership becomes not only problematic practically, in terms of steering
neighbours’ motivations, but entirely erroneous conceptually.
In its enthusiasm for ‘inclusion’, but of a different sort, and guided by its
own agenda, the EU clearly fails to discriminate between its own priorities and
what would constitute ‘mutual interests’, or indeed what would constitute
‘access’ rather than ‘control’. By utilizing external governance rather than
partnership, the EU offers a false choice to the outsiders, or, more precisely,
no choice at all: it is either co-operation on EU terms or no co-operation at
all. And this is not the choice EU’s eastern neighbours are easily prepared
to make. Being also neighbours of Russia, they struggle to balance their
relations with these two competitive powers. Furthermore, as our research
indicates, they also demonstrate a wide array of differences in culture and civi-
lization, which renders their boundaries harder for the EU to penetrate in order

























to establish the foundations for ‘shared values’. In addition, they have come to
question the notion of ‘partnership’, which they thought would work in both
directions and which instead stipulated a one-way flow of EU directives.
External governance considers EU relations with neighbours as a one-way
traffic, premised on a donor–recipient formula. This one-way modality is not
capable of recognizing the existence of ‘the other’ in the partnership, ‘the
other’ who may equally, as sovereign subjects, have their own boundaries
to consider and to shift, and whose interests and needs appear to be excluded
a priori from their equation of partnership with the EU. In other words, the
principal conceptual difficulty in applying governance at the expense of
partnership (even if ill-defined) is that the EU treats the neighbours not as
sovereign subjects, who may have their own boundaries to re-draw, but as
EU ‘objects of governance’, in a contradictory attempt to manufacture a
circle of ‘well-governed countries’, thereby running the risk of losing them
as ‘friends’.
Conceptually, the Eastern Partnership does not address this problem either,
having in place the same logic of ‘negotiated compliance’ carried from the
ENP. From this point of view, therefore, it is very difficult to see how much
more successful, and consequently more legitimate, the new initiative is
likely to be, since it is premised on the same ‘old’ presumption of EU central-
ity to the outside world, including the contested neighbourhood.
EU Official and Public Discourses: United in Inconsistency?
In addition to these conceptual (and possibly irreconcilable) problems, the
ENP/EaP also encounters difficulties of a practical nature. Owing to internal
reforms, triggered by the recent enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty plus
ramifications from the global economic and financial crises, the EU is not at
present well-placed to address the problems of the ENP/EaP’s implemen-
tation in the region.
The most critical issues do not relate to the ENP/EaP’s being under-
resourced or under-staffed, but essentially disclose the lack of coherency
and strategic vision in the policy for pursuing reforms in the neighbourhood.
There are also issues of limited legitimacy of EU foreign policy efforts within
the EU itself, as evidence from the 2007 Eurobarometer reveals. This section
will explore some horizontal and vertical discrepancies that permeate the
policy discourse at the EU official level, and will discuss low public awareness
of, and approval for, the policy among EU citizens.33
EU official discourse reveals a curious discrepancy between the key pol-
itical actors involved in its formulation and evaluation. Research analysis
has noted conspicuous differences in the discourse of the Commission officials
(EC), and members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and Member States’

























representatives (MS) in their understanding of the ENP/EaP’s role in the
eastern neighbourhood. Some scholars may insist that these discrepancies
are unavoidable, given the multifaceted nature of EU foreign policy. Never-
theless, the case could be made that, given the strategic importance of the
ENP/EaP for EU normative aspirations and its rising role as a global transfor-
mative power, more coherency and cohesion are vital to pursue these
ambitions.34
As expected, the EC officials in Brussels take a more ‘technical’ executive
approach to the ENP/EaP. After the problems with the ENP’s low legitima-
tion in the region, they seem to be less ambitious about the policy’s overall
success and measure its progress incrementally. Although united by their func-
tion to make the policy effective, they present no coherent understanding of
how it should be better managed or implemented in the region, and lay full
responsibility for the policy’s implementation on the partner countries. They
also show no particular discrimination between the relevance of governance,
which they view as positively conducive to facilitating reform, and partner-
ship in EU relations with the neighbours. This appears to be strikingly contra-
dictory to the EaP’s critical intention to offer a ‘more ambitious partnership’ as
a more re-invigorating form of co-operation for the neighbours. Partnership, in
all cases, is viewed as residual, and more about ‘projecting [the] EU model’ on
to the outsiders. Furthermore, the EaP is construed as representative of EU
strategic interests, especially of security, and partners are largely perceived
as ‘needy’ – ‘wanting membership, or money’.35
In contrast, the MEPs and MS reveal a more nuanced understanding of the
ENP/EaP’s role in the region. They all note the policy’s contradictory logic,
but settle for a ‘middle way’ approach between partnership as a strategy to
accommodate the neighbours’ interests, and governance as a more efficient
way to promote EU reforms: ‘The ENP has primarily been an attempt of gov-
ernance, but in practice . . . was forced to accept more partnership elements’.
EU security interests yet again dominate the policy’s strategic agenda, and
many MEPS and MS make no secret that ‘the notion of “shared values” is
there to cover EU values, which we wish to disseminate. The EU takes less
into consideration how the [partner] countries could positively contribute to
its future development’.36 They also seem to be more aware about the ‘cultural
gap’ between ‘us and them’, and point out, especially the new MS, that this
gap may not be easily bridgeable.
Notwithstanding these subtle differences, the reality on the ground, as seen
by the in-country officials and MS representatives, differs markedly from that
of Brussels. Not only did all the in-country officials complain, off the record,
about the lack of ‘strong and consistent EU foreign policy’, pointing to the
EaP’s limited added value and its ‘lacking teeth’; the EU delegation officials
also showed absolutely no awareness of the difference between partnership

























and governance, and were unconcerned about the use of conditionality and
the prioritization of the EU agenda. EU delegation officials also took a
more principled approach on the ground, demanding that ‘shared values’
should come first, in exchange for co-operation with the EU.37 MS yet
again appeared more willing to differentiate the policy’s limitations. They
themselves insisted, off the record, that, in order for the EU to achieve its
ambitious reforms, it should offer a long-term membership perspective, in
return for the partners’ convergence with EU norms.
Apart from some evident discrepancies in the interpretation of partnership
and the role of shared values and joint ownership, a principal disagreement
between Brussels and the in-country officials emerged on the role of Russia
in the neighbourhood. While Brussels informally acknowledges the discom-
fort of intruding into the traditional sphere of Russian interests, it also
points out that this takes place in the interests of all parties involved. On the
ground, however, in-country officials not only consider Russia as a crucial
(and often superior) player, but also as an obstacle. They also believe that
the neighbours, sandwiched between the EU and Russia, sooner or later will
have to make a choice, which of necessity is totally unacknowledged by the
Brussels officials. This choice, however, whichever way it goes, will cause
security dilemmas for the neighbours, whereby, having attractive alternatives
from both greater powers, the neighbours will find it impossible to make a
commitment, and this will precipitate uncertainty and a rising sense of
insecurity for themselves.38
In summary, our analysis of the official EU discourse at home and abroad
reveals a number of strategic gaps; these range from the understanding of part-
nership, through the nature and the direction of the developing relationship, to
the acknowledgement of partners’ boundaries, especially those of culture and
geopolitics, which the EU, from its own lofty position, has so far failed to
recognize.
Public discourse in the EU reveals similarly low levels of awareness and
differentiation between the outsiders, as well as limited understanding of what
the EU should do with the neighbours. A Eurobarometer survey39 indicated
that about two-thirds of EU respondents designate Russia and Ukraine as
their neighbours; only half of the surveyed participants treated Belarus as
such, and only a third considered Moldova a neighbour. The identification
of the four countries as EU neighbours was the strongest among the new for-
merly communist member states, which had historical links with the countries
in question. Only one in five respondents claimed to have heard about the
ENP; but, despite the limited awareness, the majority thought it would be
important to develop good-neighbourly relations with the outsiders. A simi-
larly large majority contended that the most pressing issues to tackle under
the proposed co-operation with neighbours were those of organized crime

























and terrorism, confirming that the prevalent perception of the neighbours by
the majority of EU respondents was that of a threat, rather than simply of
‘being different’.40
Two-thirds of the EU respondents agreed with the idea that the neighbours
should be offered assistance and access to EU markets. In 2007, however,
one in two believed that helping neighbours might be expensive for the EU,
which could endanger the EU’s own ‘prosperity’; and their opinion was
clearly divided over whether the EU should provide financial support
to them, with less than a third in favour of this. It is likely that, with the
financial crisis, public opinion has probably turned against co-operation,
and would find the assistance to neighbours a ‘wasteful opportunity’. The
majority of the EU respondents believed that the EU should only co-operate
with the ‘interested parties’ – that is, those who were willing to adopt EU
values.
On the issue of shared values, one in two respondents contended that the
neighbours did not have common values with people in the EU. Interestingly,
this belief was the strongest among the new post-communist member states,
whereas German, Danish, Dutch and UK respondents displayed the strongest
proclivity (on average 33 per cent) in support of shared values with the neigh-
bours. As our research in Eastern Europe indicates,41 a similar situation arises
with regard to the perception of a values gap among the neighbours. A large
majority in all four countries associated the EU with a specific set of liberal
values (including democracy, a market economy, respect for human rights,
and lawfulness). However, in their description of their own countries, three-
quarters of respondents happened to mention a diametrically opposite list of
beliefs, with fewer than 5 per cent on average failing to respond to the
question.
In summary, the above analysis suggests that the ENP and the EaP con-
tinue to experience difficulties of a conceptual and practical nature. The
EaP is not likely to make the EU’s appeal in the region more effective or legit-
imate, as it conceptually purports to value the same politics of limited equality
and ill-defined partnership with the neighbours. In practical terms, the EaP
encounters the problems of inconsistency and reduced cohesion at the
decision-making and implementation levels, thereby further reducing neigh-
bours’ feeble motivations for reform. Finally, the EU public in general,
despite being benevolently inclined towards the wider Europe, shows
limited awareness about the neighbourhood, and often perceives them as a
threat. Furthermore, the public demonstrates unwillingness to legitimize EU
‘politics of inclusion’, in the forms of financial assistance or advocacy of
more reform. Thus, public opinion in a way reflects the extent of the existing
ambivalence and lack of resolve prevalent among EU policy-makers and
officials.

























The East European Response: Too Many ‘Sizes’ to Fit the Bill?
The ambitious but ambiguous ENP has received a mixed response from the
neighbours, ranging from their hesitant approval (in the absence of a better
alternative) to an outright rejection of the policy as too political, or a
‘policy of double standards’.42 The EaP initiative intended to overcome the
problem of the ENP’s legitimation and, by offering a more substantive
notion of partnership, would foster neighbours’ closer engagement with the
EU.
On the basis of extensive research fieldwork, we shall now provide a
general overview of the East European response, which will be detailed by
individual case studies in subsequent contributions. This section will first
offer some regional comparisons between the three partner countries involved
in the ENP/EaP, and then present some general thematic observations,
concerning partners’ perceptions of and associations with the EU and its neigh-
bourhood policies, thereby offering an insight into their own boundary-drawing
in the framework of the EU partnership-building process.
Regional Overview: Individual ‘Size’ Matters
One of the most frequently cited criticisms of the ENP was that of its ‘one-
size-fits-all’ philosophy.43 In its attempt to become a ‘norm-maker’ for the
neighbourhood, the EU unreflexively intended to promote its own model,
because ‘institutions tend to export institutional isomorphism as a default
option’.44 In this endeavour, the EU aimed to alter the exterior to its own
design, mirroring ‘the deeply engrained belief that Europe’s history is a
lesson for everyone’.45 As experience demonstrates, not all the partners posi-
tively responded to the EU’s call, with some rejecting outright the idea of
‘alien values’. The EaP in its design, and on recommendations from the Euro-
pean Commission,46 intended to offer a more regional focus – to learn more
about partners – and more differentiation – to attend correspondingly to the
partners’ individual needs. Conceptually, the initiative purported to provide
more engagement with the neighbours, premised on joint ownership and
mutual commitments, thus aiming to take into account partners’ interests
and needs; however, the research reveals that, in reality, the EU has been prior-
itizing its own agenda, seen as better fitted for the outsiders’ needs. There is,
however, as Bicchi argues, a very thin line between ‘giving voice to’ the
people, and ‘speaking on someone’s behalf’;47 and the EU clearly fails here
to move beyond its Eurocentric vision of the partnership.
The research underlines the importance of differentiating every partner in
partnership, as they appear to be different, not only in their perceptions and
attitudes, but also in their ambitions and readiness to co-operate with the EU.

























Belarus, for example, stands out as a country that is prepared to engage
with the EU only on equal terms, ‘without the EU’s imposing its alien
values’.48 It clearly perceives itself as an equal partner with Europe, but con-
cedes that equal partnership with the EU may be difficult in practice. This is
not because of the EU’s size and weight on the international arena, but more
essentially because the EU has a tendency ‘to choose partners to its liking.
Whereas, we are different and conscious of our national interests, and the
EU finds it difficult to swallow’.49 Belarus is pragmatic and realistic about
its expectations of the EaP. In the words of many EU officials,50 Belarus
always comes well prepared for EU meetings, and in fact was the only
country which participated in the first joint ministerial meeting under the
EaP, with a full list of joint projects prepared for the EU’s consideration.51
Belarus is critically aware of its own internal limitations, and most of all ‘ideo-
logical’. Nevertheless, it is adamant that co-operation with the EU should be
based on joint interests rather than political values: ‘joint interests and a long
track record of co-operation may generate common values, norms and under-
standing. And not the other way around’.52
Ukrainian officials, by contrast, rejected the ENP outright and have had
similar reservations for the EaP, contending that ‘there is no policy. EaP
may give us a needed focus; but it does not offer the right path’.53 According
to many government officials, the EaP ‘offers no coordination’, ‘no adequate
resources’ and more importantly, ‘no sense of direction’. Nevertheless, faced
with the EU’s ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ presentation of choice, they feel they have
to engage: ‘The EU does not want to see Ukraine as an equal partner. We have
no trust and no concrete objectives. If we had a prospect of membership, we
would have allowed the EU to dictate’.54 All Ukrainian officials, from govern-
ment and presidential administration to parliament, were critical of EU–
Ukrainian relations of partnership: ‘there is no partnership, the idea of joint
ownership is not working . . . We come with a lot of ideas, but the EU has
its own priorities’; ‘we are not equal by definition, or at least this is what
we are led to believe’.55
Moldova’s position is altogether different. Initially, Moldovan officials
were very critical of the EaP, too, but nevertheless were prepared to
engage: ‘EaP is an odd attempt to show bureaucratically that something is
being done without any specific purpose’.56 The question of partnership has
been dismissed in Moldova as irrelevant, as ‘it is clear that the EU governs
here’,57 and there can be no equal partnership in principle between the EU
and Moldova. The country, in the opinion of all interviewees, seriously
needs reforms, and, even more so, requires clear guidance from the EU on
how to undertake them: ‘We should help the EU to see what we require.
We also need advice on how to implement our good laws. The EU is too
soft and needs to be more concrete and critical’.58 In fact, they were ready

























to draft a new Association Agreement for the EU, following existing templates
with the candidate countries, in order to start the reforms immediately.
This brief comparison of countries’ official positions in relation to the EU,
and their readiness to co-operate, demonstrates conspicuous regional diversity
and the need for the EU to approach each partner country individually. From
the interviews with government officials across the border, however, it tran-
spired that neither the EU knew the exact direction of reform, nor were the
partners themselves certain of what was required of them, under the notion
of a more ambitious partnership, leaving many ambitions unanswered, and
frustration growing.
Thematic Overview: Socio-cultural, Geopolitical and Partnership Gaps
The extensive research findings generated a number of thematic observations
which indicate serious gaps and misconceptions that exist between the partner
countries and the EU, from top-level officials to the general public, and that
need to be addressed as a matter of urgency if the EaP is to become successful
in the region.
Policies’ Low Visibility on the Ground
In contrast to the intensifying relations between the EU and its eastern partner
countries under the EaP, the policy acquires low-level legitimation and
appreciation by the general public across the border. As noted, in the EU,
the population is largely unaware of the neighbourhood policy; has limited
geographic knowledge of EU neighbours and generally perceives them as a
threat; and perceives the neighbourhood as an area of political instability
and of criminal and terrorist activities. Having limited familiarity with the
EU abroad, the public is understandably undecided about the nature and
extent of EU assistance needed for the partner states. Beyond the EU
border, in Eastern Europe, the general population displays a varied but
equally low-level awareness about the EU as a whole, often failing even to
name the administrative capital, the nature of the union and the key
member states correctly. Case-study analysis suggests that Belarus’s popu-
lation is generally uninterested, that of Ukraine is uninformed, and the popu-
lation of Moldova is, by contrast, exceptionally keen and ready. A study of
school essays further underlined a marked divergence in public acceptance
and knowledge of Europe. It has emerged that the Moldovan youth show a
greater degree of socialization and aspirations for a common European
future, whereas Ukrainian youth appear sceptical and Belarusian – indifferent.
In Russia, the younger generation espoused full support for the government’s
foreign policy course, and displayed equal interest in both the EU and the
Commonwealth of Independent States.


























In all four countries, government officials and parliamentarians point out the
importance of equal partnership in their relations with the EU. They see it first
and foremost as a relationship based on joint interests, which may lead
eventually to the development of common understanding and values: ‘Joint
interests pave the way to long-term shared values’.59 The majority of
interviewees and focus group participants commented that their countries’
co-operation with the EU was driven by EU interests and priorities in the
first instance, and this asymmetrical framework of relations, they felt, was
embedded in all EU directives and strategy documents. Many found that the
ENP and EaP are beneficial in theory, but that they fail to differentiate
among the countries they encompass. Furthermore, the newly proposed
partnership contains unclear dividends in cases where countries meet the
requirements and offers limited added value, duplicating many regulations
already realized in the past. Notwithstanding the general criticism of the asym-
metrical partnership, only Belarus insisted on steering a course towards more
equality with the EU; Ukraine and Moldova felt they had no choice but to
comply.
Geopolitics Matters
All neighbours felt that they were ‘caught’ between the EU and Russia, having
to prioritize their allegiances to one or the other. As stated above, this was not
a choice they were prepared to make unconditionally. As key officials noted,
only with the prospect of EUmembership would Moldova and Ukraine surren-
der their relationship with Russia,. In fact, however, all three countries indi-
cated that they would intend to pursue more balanced relations with both
powers, building alliances, but reserving allegiances for more substantive
propositions from either side in the future. In particular, officials in Belarus
felt they were divided about their choice of direction, upon which both
major powers tacitly insisted. Some interviewees suggested that Belarus
should be treated independently and not as ‘a bridge, or the window
between two civilizations’;60 others insisted that Belarus should ‘come to
Europe’ with Russia (‘we are too interdependent to be treated apart’61). In
either case, the sensitivity of being part of the ‘contested neighbourhood’
was strongly felt, especially in the circumstances of the recent disputes over
gas supply and pricing and the customs union with Russia. In Ukraine,
Russia was named as one of the potential obstacles for the acceleration of
EU–Ukrainian relations. Ukraine acutely felt the divisive and competitive
politics of both neighbours, which pressure has intensified under the new
Ukrainian leadership: ‘Russia is a key player here, and we should balance
our security interests, and work with Russia more’.62 In contrast, in

























Moldova officials did not necessarily see Russia as a hindrance: ‘the main
problem is the internal situation’.63 They explicitly insisted that ‘we
need[ed] to bring Russia into the equation too’, as they saw Russia as a key
player in resolving the Transnistrian conflict, a perceived stumbling bloc for
Moldova’s integration with the EU. In summary, each neighbour indicated
the difficulty of the choice they were forced to make by both powers, and
their reluctance to pledge commitments to either, in the absence of concrete
guarantees of membership from the EU. At the same time, EU officials
remained illusory about ‘working in partnership with Russia’ to promote mod-
ernization in the ‘near abroad’. Their ‘soft-power’ incentives appear to be as
politically divisive as the ‘hard politics’ of Russia.
The Socio-cultural Gap
Finally, the socio-cultural gap remains very pronounced in all four countries,
with a measure of variation related to the extent that it was viewed as bridge-
able. The majority of the survey respondents and interviewees in all four
countries insisted that cultural differences existed, especially in relation to
mentality and religion. The legal and political culture of Europeans was con-
trasted with the communal and authority-abiding living in Eastern Europe.
Respondents at all levels acknowledged that Europeans looked deprecatingly
on their neighbours, like a civilized nation on a barbarian one. The differences
also exist among the neighbours themselves. In Moldova, for example,
although officials acknowledge that ‘we don’t at present share values,
instead we repeat phrases and create illusions of values, without real practical
outcome’, they nevertheless suggest that this is all reconcilable, the more co-
operation ‘we would have with the EU’.64 Ukrainians insist on their European
identity but acknowledge that they lack a European political culture, and are
clearly burdened by the Soviet legacies and geographical disparities within the
country. Belarus tenaciously perceives itself as different: officialdom openly
acknowledges the differences in values and cultural heritage, and public
opinion points at the diametrically opposite set of values it associates with
the EU and with Belarus.
In summary, as the research indicates, EU ‘politics of inclusion’ remain
patchy and inconsistent, making it difficult for the neighbours to commit them-
selves to the European course of reform. European public opinion largely
mirrors their leadership’s lack of resolve in relation to the outsiders, and per-
ceives these neighbours mainly as a security threat. The gap widens further
across the border. The east European partners appear to be critical of and dis-
appointed by the intangible promises of partnership, and perceive their
relations with the EU as asymmetrical and one-sided. In consonance with
their peoples, they observe a distinct gap in values between the partner
countries and the EU, and sincerely struggle to reconcile conflicting priorities

























pressed upon them by their larger neighbours. EU officials, however, appear
unaware of – or indeed unconcerned by – the security dilemmas that they
inadvertently unleash on their neighbours, naively believing that what the
EU offers is a true partnership for all the parties concerned.
Structure of the Volume
This volume offers a collective assessment of the development and impact of
the ENP/EaP on its eastern neighbours, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova in
particular, juxtaposed with Russia’s stance. Founded on extensive empirical
and conceptual research, it uniquely bridges the perspectives of all parties
across the EU’s eastern border, in an attempt to detect gaps in perception
and misconceptions related to the effective implementation of the EU-
proffered partnership in the eastern region.
After this general introduction, the volume presents an individual analysis
of each of the four case studies involved in the research project, preceded by a
comparative overview of the empirical findings across the region.
In her article, Tanya Radchuk examines the whole array of thematic issues
– from foreign policy preferences and EU relations to mutual perceptions and
values – from a regional perspective, revealed by expert interviews, focus
group discussions, nationwide surveys and a study of school essays in the
countries studied. Cross-country analysis exposes the decisive significance
of Russia for its neighbours and their insistent preference for a multi-vector
foreign policy. As regards the EU, the partner countries explicitly value
trade relations and developing economic links, but at the same time believe
that the EU manages these relations primarily for its own benefit, coercing
partners into a one-sided relationship of limited choice. Very often this kind
of relationship evokes feelings of negligence and inferiority, engendering
the rise of Euro-scepticism in the front runner Ukraine, and enduring suspi-
cions in the laggard Belarus. Substantial cleavages in the value system
persist between the EU and Eastern Europe, implying that the EU’s ‘politics
of inclusion’ has yielded only limited results for the partnership-building
process in the region.
The contribution by Oleksandr Stegniy provides a specifically Ukrainian
perspective on the country’s relations with the EU. On the surface, as the
2010 presidential election revealed, Ukraine is increasingly demonstrating
the durability of its commitments to European standards. In reality, the
country is struggling to find the right balance in its relations with the EU,
and is becoming increasingly resentful and sceptical of the proposed path
for European integration. Research findings disclose a growing lack of motiv-
ation for a European future, not only within the Ukrainian political establish-
ment, but among the population too. As the author concludes, the country has

























now reached a critical juncture at which it should reassess its foreign policy
priorities and more decisively promote its national interests.
The article by the Belarusian colleagues David Rotman and Natalia Ver-
emeeva stands out in the volume as the one that exposes the critical relevance
of a ‘no choice’ situation for the contested neighbourhood. The authors trace
Belarus’s historical trajectories of its relations with the EU and Russia, and
suggest that both neighbours are continuing to manipulate the country’s pre-
carious geopolitical position in the pursuit of their specific, security-predicated
interests. While constantly feeling under pressure, and often torn apart by the
contradictory demands of both sides, Belarus naturally resists offering full
allegiances to either, and remains acutely conscious of its national strategic
interests and of the importance of equal partnership in its relations with the
outside world.
The analysis of Moldova’s situation, provided here by Olga Danii and
Mariana Mascauteanu, yet again questions the effectiveness and the finalite´
of the ENP/EaP for the neighbourhood, and especially those countries that
make the course of European integration their explicit national priority.
Both authors insist that the current indeterminacy of the EU regarding Moldo-
va’s future considerably inhibits the progress of reform in the country, and
erodes its motivation and commitment to the quality and pace of progress.
Being exceptionally enthusiastic and knowledgeable about Europe, the
country also feels trapped between the EU’s ambiguous promises and
Russia’s unwillingness to resolve the Transnistrian conflict, which, Moldova
feels, is critical for its progressive relations with the EU. Often feelings of
abandonment and lack of commitment on the EU side dominate Moldovan
official discourse. In general, however, the country remains, at all levels,
one of the staunchest supporters of European integration, and is ready to co-
operate no matter what happens.
Finally, the article by Sergey Tumanov, Alexander Gasparishvili and
Ekaterina Romanova reveals what the Russians really think of the EU and
its policies towards the eastern region. It contends that, although Russia is
beginning to prioritize the EU in its foreign policy, evidence also suggests
that it is also becoming increasingly conscious and defensive of its strategic
interests in the ‘near abroad’ (former Soviet republics). While there is little
open official discussion of the potential impact of the ENP/EaP on the area,
Russia’s relations with partner countries, informal interviews and public
opinion point to growing discontentment with what is perceived as the EU’s
encroachment on Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. As it is illustratively
revealed by public perceptions of Ukraine as a country hostile to Russia
following its rapprochement with the EU, Russia still entertains its divisive
Cold War attitude of ‘who is not with us, is against us’ towards its external
environment, and on that basis intensifies the promotion of its interests in

























the neighbourhood. Whether this succeeds is a question upon which individual
country contributions comment, but the issue of competitive strategies and
interests on the part of the EU and of Russia in the contested area remains.
In conclusion, the volume offers a unique up-to-date insiders’ perspective
on the effectiveness of the ENP and EaP, and their potential for strengthening
EU relations with the neighbourhood. The issues of boundary politics,
especially of geopolitics and culture, remain critically important for the part-
ners in the east, and underscore the need to reassess EU perceptions of the
boundaries. These are not only the boundaries of the EU’s own design, but
also those of the partners, which a global player such as the EU rightfully
has to acknowledge. In synopsis, the notion of partnership remains at stake,
especially for legitimizing EU policies among the outsiders. Learning about
‘the other’, and recognizing their interests in partnership, is the key for effec-
tive co-operation in the future. Whether the EU is able to take this ‘de-centring
approach’65 towards the neighbourhood is an area for further research and
discussion.
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